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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Marvin Gordon Grotto appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, claiming the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Boise Police Department neighborhood contact officer, Steve Keely, went
to Grotto's home at approximately 4:00 p.m. to follow-up on a tip he received
regarding a concern that there was "drug sales or activity" occurring there.
(10/10/2014 Tr., p.7, Ls.23-24, p.8, Ls.23-25, p.9, Ls.1-16, p.25, L.22 - p.26,
L.4.) The reporting party "described frequent foot traffic and vehicle traffic in and
out of the trailer that stayed for a short amount of time." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.9,
Ls.16-18.)

There had been a similar "complaint prior to that as well."

(10/10/2014 Tr., p.9, Ls.19-20; see also p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.13.) When Officer
Keely, accompanied by Officer Will Reimers, arrived at Grotto's house, there was
"very loud" music playing and Officer Keely had to knock several times and "a
little harder than normal" before Grotto answered. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.9, L.21 p.10, L.20, p.53, L.8 - p.54, L.5, p.64, Ls.1-7; Exhibit 1, 01 :00-02:03.)

After

Grotto answered, Officer Keely, who was in uniform, asked if they could come in,
and Grotto agreed. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11, L. 5, p.13, Ls.2-7, p.54,
Ls.17-21; Exhibit 1, 02:20.) Officer Keely explained that they were there because
they had received a tip concerning the amount of traffic at Grotto's house and the
possibility that the traffic was related to drug activity.
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(10/10/2014 Tr., p.12,

Ls.21-23; Exhibit

03:10-03:40.) Grotto responded that he has "caretakers," a

PSR worker, and therapists thaf regularly come to his home, and a few friends
that occasionally visit. (Exhibit 1, 03:35, 03:45, 04:04, 04:30-04:33, 05:37-05:46.)
Officer Keely asked Grotto if he occasionally smoked "weed." 1 (Exhibit 1,
04:54.) Grotto admitted he did but said it was "not an everyday deal." (Exhibit 1,
04:54-04:58.) Officer Keely told Grotto the "easiest way to clean the complaint
up" was to come talk to him and verify there was no "validity" to it, and he asked
Crotto if he would "mind walking around with Officer Reimer just to make sure"
there was not a "big grow" or "drugs all over the house." (Exhibit 1, 05:55-06: 17 .)
Crotto answered, "I prefer not." (Exhibit 1, 06:18; 10/10/2014 Tr., p.15, L.25 p.16, L.3.) Officer Keely advised Crotto that if he just had a pipe or a "small
amount," that was "no big deal," and would not result in an arrest. (Exhibit 1,
06:19-07:17.) Officer Keely suggested they could just "deal with it" by having
Crotto collect it. (Exhibit 1, 07:15; 10/10/2014 Tr., p.16, Ls.4-10.) Crotto said he
would and "went to his bedroom," and "Officer Reimers followed him down the
hallway" while Grotto "retrieved [a] marijuana pipe." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.16, Ls.1013.) Crotto, however, was "concerned about [Officer Reimers] corning into his
bedroom," but "[t]hat was resolved by him agreeing to let Officer Reimers stand
at the doorway versus enter[ing] his bedroom."

(10/10/2014 Tr., p.16, L.23 -

p.17, L.8; see also p.18, Ls.4-6; Exhibit 1, 07:17-09:23.)

Officer Keely testified that, when he entered Crotto's home, he noticed a sign
on the wall that depicted a marijuana leaf and had "4:20" on it, which "is a typical
word reference [for] drug activity or drug use." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.12, Ls.6-12;
see also p.32, L.20 - p.34, L.7.)
1
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After Grotto retrieved his marijuana pipe, Officer Keely told him he thought
there was "a little bit more" there based on how nervous Grotto was and the way
he was acting. (Exhibit 1, 12:20-12:46.) Grotto responded by going "back to the
room" and getting "a canister or a tin that had green residue or small amounts of
marijuana nuggets of some type." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.19, Ls.2-8.) Based on the
marijuana and paraphernalia Grotto had provided to that point, Officer Keely
again asked for consent to search, but Grotto declined.

(10/10/2014 Tr., p.19,

L.22 - p.20, L.2.) After further discussion, and Officer Keely's assurances that
he did not intend to take Grotto to jail unless he found a "dead body," Grotto
again got up and went to his bedroom and brought back "approximately an ounce
of marijuana buds." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.20, L.5 - p.21, L.13; Exhibit 1, 14:2917:05.)
After Grotto's third trip to his room to get contraband, Officer Keely
repeated his suspicion that Grotto was still hiding something, particularly in his
safe, which is where all of the other contraband Grotto retrieved was located.
(10/10/2014 Tr., p.21, Ls.16-23, p.59, Ls.9-11; Exhibit 1, 17:09-18:00.)

As

before, during the course of the ensuing conversation, Grotto again went back to
his bedroom; on this fourth trip, Grotto "brought back a small Ziploc baggies [sic]
with a white crystal substance that appeared ... to be methamphetamine."
(10/10/2014 Tr., p.21,

L.16 -

p.22, L.25.)

After Grotto produced the

methamphetamine, his demeanor became more relaxed, and he consented to a
search by Officer Reimers. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.24, L.7 - p.25, L.6, p.59, L.15 p.60, L.7.) Officer Reimers' search uncovered only additional paraphernalia; he
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not find more marijuana or methamphetamine. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.24, Ls.13-

The state charged Grotto with possession of a controlled substance,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and possession of
drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.6-8, 27-28, 33-34.)

Grotto filed a motion to

suppress, asserting the evidence seized by law enforcement was "done without
probable cause, without a warrant or [Grotto's] consent, and without exigent
circumstances."

(R., p.43; see also pp.45-51 (brief in support of motion to

suppress).) More specifically, Grotto argued that his consent to the search of the
safe in his bedroom was not free and voluntary, and was the product of "duress
and/or coercion." (R., pp.48-50.) The district court held a hearing on Grotto's
motion after which it entered a written decision denying Grotto's request for
suppression. (R., pp.64-73.)
After the court denied Grotto's motion to suppress, Grotto entered into a
binding plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to possession with
intent to deliver and the state agreed to dismiss the other two charges.
pp.76-77.)

(R.,

The agreed-upon sentence was a suspended unified term of five

years, with two years fixed. (R., p.77.) As part of the plea agreement, Grotto
reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

(R., p.77.)

Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, the district court imposed a
suspended five-year sentence with two years fixed, from which Grotto filed a
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.82-87, 94-95.)

4

ISSUE

Crotto states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Crotto's motion to
suppress when Mr. Crotto's consent to search the safe was
involuntary based on the totality of the circumstances?
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Crotto failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing
supports the conclusion that Crotto's conduct was consensual as was Crotto's
ultimate consent to search?
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ARGUMENT
Grotto Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Grotto contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

because, he claims, he "tried to withdraw his consent numerous times," and "also
possessed such mental disabilities to make him incapable of providing voluntary
consent under the circumstances."

(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

Grotto further

argues the officers "had knowledge of [his] incapacity" and "subtly coerce[d] [him]
until he unwillingly gave in to the officers' demands." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.)
Grotto's claims fail. The district court correctly concluded, based on the evidence
presented and the applicable legal standards, that Grotto's consent was not
coerced, and Grotto was not entitled to suppression.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.

When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).
Whether a consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, the
determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds,
146 Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145
Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008).

"Findings will not be

deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in the
6

." Stewart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v. Jaborra,
143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying
Grotto's Motion To Suppress
A necessary predicate to a claimed Fourth Amendment violation is the

existence of an unconstitutional search or seizure.

See State v. Jaborra, 143

Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006) ("The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches.").

Most of the

evidence seized from Grotto's residence was not, however, found pursuant to a
search; rather, it was provided by Grotto. Thus, it is important to be clear about
which evidence Grotto seeks to suppress and the basis for suppression.
In his written motion, Grotto requested an order "suppressing any and all
information and/or evidence that was obtained as a result of a search of [Grotto's]
home."

(R., p.43.)

In his supporting memorandum, Grotto asserted he

"inevitably capitulated to the [officers'] repeated requests to search his
residence." (R., p.50.) The only search of Grotto's home, however, was when
Grotto consented to a search, which included his safe, after he gave the officers
paraphernalia,

marijuana,

and

methamphetamine.

summarizes his complaint as follows:

On

appeal,

Grotto

"In sum, Mr. Grotto contends that the

totality of the circumstances demonstrate by substantial and competent evidence
that his consent to search the safe was involuntary." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.)
This summation accurately reflects the only search that occurred.

Thus,

suppression of any evidence obtained before the search, i.e., the paraphernalia,

7

marijuana, and methamphetamine Grotto provided to Officers Keely and Reimers
would not be subject to suppression.
Grotto is also not entitled to suppression of the paraphernalia Officer
Reimers found during his only search because that search was conducted
pursuant to Grotto's consent. A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid
consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Schneckloth v. Bustamante,

412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations omitted); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852,
26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001 ). Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 225-26 (citations omitted).

The voluntariness of an individual's

consent is a question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the
circumstances. Varie, 135 Idaho at 852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing Schnleckloth, 412
U.S. at 248-49). In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of duress or
coercion, either direct or implied.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.

The mere

presence of officers asking for consent to search is not sufficient, as a matter of
law, to constitute improper police duress or coercion.

See United States v.

Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Nor does an "officer's truthful explanation that the
officer could obtain a warrant" render consent involuntary. State v. Kapelle, 158
Idaho 121, _ , 344 P.3d 901, 909 (Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted). Instead,
the court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and find consent
involuntary only if "coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a
claim of lawful authority .... " State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 158, 657 P.2d
17, 22 (1983) (emphasis original) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233). "The
trial court is the proper forum for the 'careful sifting of the unique facts and

8

circumstances of each case' necessary in determining voluntariness." State v.
Rector, 144 Idaho 643, 645, 167 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct.

2006) (quoting

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233).
With respect to the search, Crotto complains his consent was involuntary
because of his "mental disability." (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-18.) In support of this
argument, Crotto contends the district court erroneously found that Crotto
"reference[d] his PSR worker just one time to explain away the frequent traffic in
and out of his home."

(Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

According to Crotto, he

"repeatedly referenced his PSR worker to express his lack of sophistication, his
inability to understand the situation, and his distress brought on by the officers'
persistent questioning." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

Crotto's argument misstates

the district court's decision and the evidence presented at the suppression
hearing.
The district court's discussion of Crotto's references to his PSR worker
reads as follows:
It is true that early on in the encounter, the defendant
mentioned having a PSR worker for "mental" problems, and later in
the encounter expressed a desire to go to (what the Court
understands to be) a mental health treatment facility, one with
which the defendant obviously has some familiarity, given how
quickly he stated its name to the officers in a state of high anxiety.
However, the Court cannot agree that the officers took advantage
of what they knew or believed to be the defendant's diminished
capacities so as to coerce the defendant's consent, or that the
defendant (objectively speaking) was unable to validly consent due
to his mental condition(s).
The defendant's reference to his PSR worker, taken in
context, was clearly intended as a means of explaining to the
officers why it might have appeared to the anonymous tipster that
the traffic in and out of his home was consistent with drug-dealing,
9

rather than to inform the officers that the defendant was
significantly mentally impaired for purposes of the investigation. In
fact, it can be argued that the defendant's ready response to the
officer's summation of the tipster's concerns (i.e. by incorporating
the PSR workers' visits into his explanation for the traffic coming
into and out of his house) showed considerable sophistication on
the part of the defendant, and a more-than-adequate ability to
understand the situation with which he was confronted. This
inference, derived from the Court's review of the audio, is
consistent with the testimony offered by the officers themselves,
both of whom stated that the defendant seemed well able to
understand the situation and to respond appropriately to the
officers' questions, to include refusing numerous requests to search
and expressing skepticism concerning the officers' veracity on a
number of subjects.
Viewing the encounter as a whole, there is simply no
indication that the defendant's mental health condition(s) rendered
him unable to validly consent to a search of the safe. There is also
no indication that the officers did anything out of the ordinary, in
terms of their investigative tactics, to take advantage of any mental
health issues of the defendant (even assuming, arguendo, that they
had any specific knowledge or beliefs concerning these issues).
Rather, the evidence supports the officers' testimony that the
defendant possessed adequate mental faculties, at the time of the
encounter, to validly consent to the search of the safe.
(R., pp.72-73.)

Grotto quotes only the last paragraph of the district court's discussion on
this point and appears to extrapolate from that, as well as the court's finding that
Grotto referenced his PSR worker "to explain the frequent traffic in and out of his
home," a "finding[]" that Grotto "reference[d] his PSR worker just one time."
(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) While the district court clearly uses the singular form of
the word "reference" in its discussion, it strains credulity to assert that this reflects
a specific finding by the court that Grotto made only one reference to his PSR
worker. When read as a whole, and in context, the district court's point was not
that Grotto made a single reference, it was that Grotto referred to a PSR worker
10

to explain why he had a lot of traffic at his home. This finding is supported by the
evidence.
The audio of the interaction between Grotto and the officers reveals that
Grotto mentioned his PSR worker, as well as other caregivers, in response to
Officer Keely telling him about the nature of the complaint, which was based on
the amount of traffic at Grotto's home.

(Exhibit 1, 03: 10-05:46.)

Grotto also

made a later reference to his PSR worker in response to Officer Reimers saying
something about people "coming and going" - again referring to the reported
traffic at Grotto's home.

(Exhibit 1, 11 :45-11 :49.)

Finally, shortly before the

officers left, Grotto said, "All the traffic is from my PSR workers, and caretakers
and stuff, that's where the traffic is coming from."

(Exhibit 1, 47:56-50:00.)

Contrary to Grotto's argument on appeal, the district court did not clearly err in
concluding that Grotto's reference to a PSR worker was to explain the traffic at
his home. That Grotto made a few other references to a PSR worker does not
show otherwise.
Nor do Grotto's other references to a PSR worker support Grotto's claim
that he made such references "to express his lack of sophistication, his inability
to understand the situation, and his distress brought on by the officers' persistent
questioning." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.)

For example, at one point Grotto told

Officer Keely to "[g]et a hold of [his] PSR worker, or [his] caretaker or something."
(Exhibit 1, 08:23.) Grotto's advice that Officer Keely should "[g]et a hold of [his]
PSR worker" was not in response to any question; Grotto said that after Officer
Keely said, "We're trying to work with ya."
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(Exhibit 1, 08:22-08:25.)

Grotto's

desire to have Officer Keely contact the PSR worker could have been an
invitation to corroborate

explanation for

traffic, but it was not an

expression of a "lack of sophistication," "inability to understand the situation," or
an apparent sign of distress.
Grotto also contends that the audio also reflects him saying "Please,
please, let my PSR [inaudible]." (Appellant's Brief, p.17 (citing Exhibit 1, 23:3623: 39).) The state cannot agree that this is an accurate recitation of what Grotto
said. While the state can discern Grotto referencing his PSR worker after Officer
Reimers tells him they can "re-explain" the possible option of obtaining a search
warrant, the state is unable to hear Grotto say, "please, please, let my."
Moreover, just as Grotto can be heard saying "PSR," Officer Keely is talking at
the same time and telling Grotto: "To this point, Marvin, your friend is here and
he can explain it as well. To this point we've worked on your consent, which
means you've been cooperating even though you're bummed about giving up
your weed and stuff, you've cooperated to this point with us." (Exhibit 1, 23:3223:49.) The Court need not decide precisely what Grotto said during this part of
the interaction as it relates to Grotto's argument that his reference to a PSR
worker was made for the purpose of showing he was unable "to understand the
situation" (Appellant's Brief, p.16), because, regardless of any PSR worker,
Grotto can be heard saying: "I don't understand all this" (Exhibit 1, 23:30). That
said, Grotto's statement that he did not understand does not make it so. In fact,
the evidence shows that the officers perceived otherwise. Both Officer Keely and
Officer Reimers testified that nothing about Grotto's behavior suggested to them
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that Grotto had any difficulty understanding their questions or was otherwise
confused. (10/10/2014

, p.15, Ls.5-9, p.60, Ls.8-15.) Officer Keely specifically

testified:
... [H]e was very articulate. I believe he understood very clearly.
And even to the point of mentioning wanting to leave to go to
lntermountain. I felt that he was very cognitive and knew what he
was doing and saying. Yeah, I didn't see it -- noticeable disability
by any means that would make me think he was not capable to
make those decisions on his own.
(10/10/2014 Tr., p.23, L.24- p.24, L.6.)
Contrary to Grotto's claims on appeal, the audio supports the district
court's general characterization of the purpose of Grotto's reference to his PSR
worker as "clearly intended as a means of explaining to the officers why it might
have appeared to the anonymous tipster that the traffic in and out of his home
was consistent with drug-dealing," and was not for the purpose of "inform[ing] the
officers that [he] was significantly mentally impaired for purposes of the
investigation." (R., p.72.)
Grotto next asserts that, "[i]n addition to the repeated references to his
PSR worker, [he] and his friend made other statements that established [his]
mental disability." (Appellant's Brief, p.18.) In support of this argument, Grotto
relies on (1) telling Officer Keely, "kind of mental," in response to Officer Keely
asking what kind of disability Grotto had; (2) Grotto's friend telling Officer Keely
that Grotto "was 'a head case,' had 'some mental issues, and was '[n]ot one
hundred percent there"'; (3) Grotto asking to go to lntermountain because he
could "not think"; and (4) Grotto telling the officers "he did not understand their
explanation of the search warrant process."

13

(Appellant's Brief, p.18 (citing

Exhibit 1, 4: 19-4:22,
(brackets original).)

12:50-13:30,

19:06-19:32, 20:18-20:27, 23:27-23:35)

According to Grotto, "[t]his evidence shows that Officers

Keely and Reimers learned of [Grotto's] mental disability."

(Appellant's Brief,

p.18; see also p.16 (claiming "Officers Keely and Reimers had knowledge of his
mental disability").) Grotto's claim fails for two reasons.

First, although Grotto

argued at the suppression hearing that he has a mental disability, he did not
present any actual evidence of such. (See Tr., p.69, L.15 - p.73, L.18, p.74, L.4
- p.75, L.24.) Second, as noted, both Officer Keely and Officer Reimers testified
to the contrary, denying that they "knew" Grotto was confused and did not
understand what they were saying. (10/10/2014 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9, p.60, Ls.8-15.)
With respect to Grotto's reference to a PSR worker, Officer Keely testified that he
did not know precisely what a PSR worker does, "other than assisting people
with different types of issues that they might have." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.40, L.22 p.41, L.2.)

Officer Keely also testified he has "seen people who had no

disabilities assigned PSR workers." (10/10/2014 Tr., p.41, Ls.5-6.) That Grotto
claimed to have a PSR worker and that his friend expressed an opinion that
Grotto was a "head case" who had "mental issues" does not establish that
Officers Keely and Reimers "knew" Grotto was mentally incapable of giving
consent or responding to the officers' questions.

Rather, this evidence only

shows that Grotto said he had a PSR worker for "kind of mental" reasons, and
Grotto's friend had certain opinions about Grotto's mental status. Officers are not
required to accept such representations and opinions as fact, especially when
their observations do not suggest any mental impairment that should give them
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pause before proceeding with their investigation.
405, 411, 283 P.3d 722, 728

See State v. Danney, 1

1) ("the existence of alternative

explanations does not necessarily negate reasonable suspicion"). Grotto's claim
that the evidence established he has a mental disability, and that Officers Keely
and Reimers were aware of such, fails.
Grotto next argues:
In addition to Mr. Grotto's vulnerable subjective state, Mr.
Grotto's attempts to revoke consent show that his eventual consent
to search the safe was involuntary. The district court found that Mr.
Grotto knew that he could refuse consent to search based on the
fact that Mr. Grotto "repeatedly refused to consent to direct
requests by Officer Keely to search, and the officers honored is
refusal." (R., p.71.) Mr. Grotto submits that these findings are
clearly erroneous.
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.)
In support of this argument, Grotto claims "substantial and competent
evidence shows that he did not know he could refuse to consent" because, he
contends, Officers Keely and Reimers "ignored his attempts at revocation."
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.) The alleged "attempts at revocation" Grotto relies on
are all based on Grotto's "trip[s]" to the bedroom where he retrieved contraband
for the officers, all of which proceeded his consent

to

search. (Appellant's Brief,

pp.19-20.) It is illogical to argue, as Grotto does, that he "attempt[ed]"

to

revoke

consent before he ever gave it.
After citing the applicable legal standards (R., p.68), the district court
concluded that, "although police undoubtedly used sharp investigative tactics in
order to coax the defendant into consenting to the search of his bedroom safe,
the officers never strayed beyond the confines of the law (i.e. by coercing the
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defendant's consent) in doing so, and hence the motion to suppress must be
denied." (R., p.69.) Grotto has failed to show the district court erred.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
on Grotto's conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver.
DATED this 30th day of October, 2015.
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